Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. At the same time, Esequiel Hernandez Jr., an 18-year-old high school sophomore, was tending to his family's goat herd in the same area. 3 The Marines had been patrolling the area for three days in a clandestine manner, their goal to remain undetected. 4 While there is some dispute as to whether Hernandez saw the Marines, the Marines allege that Hernandez fired two shots at them with a rifle he carried with him to protect his flock from predators. 5 To protect themselves and to determine what Hernandez was doing, the Marines kept Hernandez in sight by following him. 6 When Hernandez raised his rifle for a third time, Corporal Clemente Banuelos, the leader of the Marine unit, fearing that one of his troops was about to be shot, fired one shot at Hernandez, striking him in the right of his rib cage. 7 When the law enforcement officials summoned by the Marines arrived, Hernandez was dead, the first U.S. citizen killed by the military on U.S. soil as part of the war on drugs. 8 Early in 1997, Senator Charles Grassley learned that an active-duty Army colonel was serving at the FBI as deputy chief of a counter-terrorism unit. 9 Senator Grassley sent letters to the Justice Department and the Department of Defense inquiring about the assignment. 10 He also had the officer, Colonel John Ellis, come to Capitol Hill to be interviewed by his staff.
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What do these seemingly unrelated incidents have in common?
They both raised issues concerning an old, and usually rather obscure statute 12 , the Posse Comitatus Act.
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the Posse Comitatus Act, its history and purpose, and the implications it has today for domestic military operations. At the same time, I will address whether the Act needs further changes in light of the military's roles and missions in our changing world.
GENESIS OF THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT
The American fears of a large standing army and interference in civilian affairs by the military started before the formation of the united States. Our complaints with the English monarchy, as stated in the Declaration of Independence included:
He has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies without the consent of our legislatures. He has affected to render the military independent of and superior to the civil power... For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us:
Somewhat surprising, however, is the fact that the Constitution is silent concerning the enforcement of civil laws by the military.
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It wasn't until after the Civil War that numerous complaints were raised concerning the use of the military to enforce laws. One of the methods used by JTF6 is to send out listening or observation posts along the border.
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The mission of these posts is to observe while remaining undetected.
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If they spot any unusual activity they are to radio Border Patrol agents who would make any confrontations or arrests.
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This sort of indirect assistance by the military is not the sort of law enforcement role prohibited by the Act.
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The fact that the Marines were required to take a more active role in self-defense does not mean that the Act was violated.
As for the assignment of COL John Ellis to the FBI, the FBI kept COL Ellis away from law enforcement functions and did not allow him access to some of the most sensitive law enforcement information. it is always only augmentation of other law enforcement agencies.
As for the type of training involved, the military has been used in a manner to take advantage of its training. Whether it is tracking an airplane suspected of containing drugs, interdicting a boat at sea, or operating an observation post along the border, the missions are more akin to military missions than to traditional law enforcement efforts.
To argue that military personnel will not be cognizant of individual rights is by far the most spurious argument made.
Every member of the U.S. military is well schooled in and has had a true appreciation of an individual's rights drummed in them at every level. The concern about the damage to military readiness brought about by a law enforcement mission is more difficult to dismiss.
In fact, the military has objected to increased involvement in drug interdiction.
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This involvement diverts personnel and resources in a down-sized military from traditional war-fighter missions and training. In some instances equipment has required modification to support this role, modifications that would not be required without this mission, and ones that may even detract from the normal use of this equipment. 118 Another concern in this area is that people promoted and selected for leadership in these types of missions may not be the best ones to lead in combat.
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A leader must still motivate his people and use the personnel and equipment at his or her disposal to accomplish the mission. The leader still has to make judgments in a timely manner based on the information available.
Many times in law enforcement roles, leaders and their subordinates are faced with situations that test their courage and ability to function in a crisis.
There is nothing incompatible with these leadership traits and those we expect of our combat leaders. The bottom line on readiness: There are some valid policy considerations that support a less active role in law enforcement activities by the military, but they do not rise to the level calling for a change in the law.
The final argument used to support a reduction of military involvement in the war on drugs is that it is the wrong tool for the job. Usually, the military has been used in temporary situations or ones of relatively short duration, but the war on drugs is a long-term effort with no end in sight.
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The length of the mission is not an important factor in deciding whether it is a proper role for the military. However, it is also more expensive to use military personnel for this mission than it is to use civilian. 121 Matthew Hammond indicates that a soldier costs the government $82,000 a year in training and upkeep, while the use of a civilian law enforcement person would be cheaper.
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There may be some wisdom in this analysis, and, at least in some areas, an effort to use more civilians to patrol our southern border is under way.
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In the absence of greater numbers of civilians to take on this important function, the military may be forced to keep the mission.
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